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Abstract. It is now well known that decentralised optimisation can be
formulated as a potential game, and game-theoretical learning algorithms
can be used to find an optimum. One of the most common learning tech-
niques in game theory is fictitious play. However fictitious play is founded
on an implicit assumption that opponents’ strategies are stationary. We
present a novel variation of fictitious play that allows the use of a more
realistic model of opponent strategy. It uses a heuristic approach, from
the online streaming data literature, to adaptively update the weights
assigned to recently observed actions. We compare the results of the pro-
posed algorithm with those of stochastic and geometric fictitious play in
a simple strategic form game, a vehicle target assignment game and a dis-
aster management problem. In all the tests the rate of convergence of the
proposed algorithm was similar or better than the variations of fictitious
play we compared it with. The new algorithm therefore improves the
performance of game-theoretical learning in decentralised optimisation.
1 Introduction
Decentralised optimisation is a crucial component of sensor networks [1, 2], dis-
aster management [3], traffic control [4] and scheduling [5]. In each of these
domains a combination of computational and communication complexity render
centralised optimisation approaches intractable. It is now well known that many
decentralised optimisation problems can be formulated as a potential game [6–8].
Hence the optimisation problem can be recast in terms of finding a Nash equilib-
rium of a potential game. An iterative decentralised optimisation algorithm can
therefore be considered a type of learning in games algorithm, and vice versa.
Fictitious play is the canonical example of learning in games [9]. Under fic-
titious play each player maintains some beliefs about his opponents’ strategies,
and based on these beliefs he chooses the action that maximises his expected
reward. The players then update their beliefs about opponents’ strategies after
observing their actions. Fictitious play converges to Nash equilibrium for certain
kinds of games [9, 10] but in practice this convergence can be very slow. This is
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2because it implicitly assumes that the other players use a fixed strategy in the
whole game by giving the same weight to every observed action.
In [11] this problem was addressed by using particle filters to predict oppo-
nents’ strategies. The drawback of this approach is the computational cost of
the particle filters that render difficult the application of this method in real life
applications.
In this paper we propose an alternative method which uses a heuristic rule
to adapt the weights of opponents’ strategies by taking into account their re-
cent actions. We observe empirically that this approach reduces the number of
steps that fictitious play needs to converge to a solution, and hence the commu-
nications overhead between the distributed optimisers that is required to find
a solution to the distributed optimisation problem. In addition the computa-
tional demand of the proposed algorithm is similar to the classic fictitious play
algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We start with a brief
description of game theory, fictitious play and stochastic fictitious play. Section
3 introduces adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play (AFFFP). The impact of
the algorithm’s parameters on its performance is studied in Section 4. Section
5 presents the results of AFFFP for a climbing hill game, a vehicle target as-
signment game and a disaster management simulation scenario. We finish with
a conclusion.
2 Background
In this section we introduce the relationship between potential games and decen-
tralised optimisation, as well as the classical fictitious play learning algorithm.
2.1 Potential games and decentralised optimisation
A class of games which maps naturally to the decentralised optimisation frame-
work is strategic form games. The elements of a strategic form game are [12]
– a set of players 1, 2, . . . , I,
– a set of actions si ∈ Si for each player i ∈ I,
– a set of joint actions, s = (s1, s2, . . . , sI) ∈ S1 × S2 × . . .× SI = S,
– a payoff function ui : S → R for each player i, where ui(s) is the utility that
player i will gain after a specific joint action s has been played.
We will often write s = (si, s−i), where si is the action of Player i and s−i is the
joint action of Player i’s opponents.
The rules that the players use to select the action that they will play in a game
are called strategies. A player i chooses his actions according to a pure strategy
when he selects his actions by using a deterministic rule. In the cases that he
chooses an action based on a probability distribution then he acts according to a
mixed strategy. If we denote the set of all the probability distributions over the
3action space Si as ∆i, then a mixed strategy of player i is an element σi ∈ ∆i.
We define ∆ as the set product of all ∆i, ∆ = ∆1×. . .×∆I . Then the joint mixed
strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σI), is defined as an element of ∆ and we will often write
σ = (σi, σ−i) analogously to s = (si, s−i). We will denote the expected utility
a player i will gain if he chooses a strategy σi (resp. si), when his opponents
choose the joint strategy σ−i as ui(σi, σ−i) (resp. ui(si, σ−i)).
Many decision rules can be used by the players to choose their actions in
a game. One of them is to choose their actions from a set of mixed strategies
that maximises their expected utility given their beliefs about their opponents’
strategies. When Player i’s opponents’ strategies are σ−i then the best response
of player i is defined as:
BRi(σ−i) = argmax
σi∈∆i
ui(σi, σ−i). (1)
Nash [13], based on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, showed that every game
has at least one equilibrium. This equilibrium is a strategy σˆ that is a fixed point
of the best response correspondence, σˆi ∈ BRi(σˆ−i)∀i. Thus when a joint mixed
strategy σˆ is a Nash equilibrium then
ui(σˆi, σˆ−i) ≥ ui(si, σˆ−i) for all i, for all si ∈ Si. (2)
Equation (2) implies that if a strategy σˆ is a Nash equilibrium then it is not
possible for a player to increase his utility by unilaterally changing his strategy.
When all the players in a game select equilibrium actions using pure strategies
then the equilibrium is referred as pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
A particularly useful category of games for multi-agent decision problems is
the class of potential games [10, 8, 7]. The utility function of an exact potential
game satisfies the following property:
ui(si, s−i)− ui(s˜i, s−i) = φ(si, s−i)− φ(s˜i, s−i) (3)
where φ is a potential function and the above equality stands for every player i,
for every action s−i ∈ S−i, and for every pair of actions si, s˜i ∈ Si. The poten-
tial function depicts the changes in the players’ payoffs when they unilaterally
change their actions. Every potential game has at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium [10]. There may be more than one, but at any equilibrium no player
can increase their reward, therefore the potential function, through a unilateral
deviation.
Wonderful life utility [6, 7] is a method to design the individual utility func-
tions of a potential game such that the global utility function of a decentralised
optimisation problem acts as the potential function. Player i’s utility when a
joint action s = (si, s−i) is performed, is the difference in global utility obtained
by the player selecting action si in comparison with the global utility that would
have been obtained if i had selected an (arbitrarily chosen) reference action si0:
ui(si, s−i) = ug(si, s−i)− ug(si0, s−i) (4)
4where ug is the global utility function. Hence the decentralised optimisation
problem can be cast as a potential game, and any algorithm that is proved to
converge to Nash equilibria will converge to a joint action from which no player
can increase the global reward through unilateral deviation.
2.2 Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is a widely used learning technique in game theory. In fictitious
play each player chooses his action according to the best response to his beliefs
about opponent’s strategy.
Initially each player has some prior beliefs about the strategies that his oppo-
nents use to choose actions. The players, after each iteration, update their beliefs
about their opponents’ strategy and play again the best response according to
their beliefs. More formally in the beginning of a game players maintain some
arbitrary non-negative initial weight functions κj0, j = 1, . . . , I that are updated
using the formula:
κjt (s
j) = κjt−1(s
j) + Isjt=sj
(5)
for each j, where Isjt=sj
=
{
1 if sjt = s
j
0 otherwise.
.
The mixed strategy of opponent j is estimated from the following formula:
σjt (s
j) =
κjt (s
j)∑
sj κ
j
t (s
j)
. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) are equivalent to:
σjt (s
j) =
(
1− 1
tj
)
σjt−1(s
j) +
1
tj
Isjt=sj
(7)
where tj = t +
∑
sj∈Sj κ
j
0(s
j). Player i chooses an action which maximises his
expected payoffs given his beliefs about his opponents’ strategies.
The main purpose of a learning algorithm like fictitious play is to converge
to a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium. For classic fictitious play (7)
it has been proved [9] that if σ is a strict Nash equilibrium and it is played
at time t then it will be played for all further iterations of the game. Also any
steady state of fictitious play is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, it has been
proved that fictitious play converges for 2 × 2 games with generic payoffs [14],
zero sum games [15], games that can be solved using iterative dominance [16]
and potential games [10]. There are also games where fictitious play does not
converge to a Nash equilibrium. Instead it can become trapped in a limit cycle
whose period is increasing through time. An example of such a game is Shapley’s
game [17].
A player i that uses the classic fictitious play algorithm uses best responses to
his beliefs to choose his actions, so he chooses his actions si from his pure strategy
space Si. Randomisation is allowed only in the case that players are indifferent
between his available actions, but it is very rare in generic payoff strategic form
5games for a player to be indifferent between the available actions [18]. Stochastic
fictitious play is a variation of fictitious play where players use mixed strategies
in order to choose actions. This variation was originally introduced to allow
convergence of players’ strategies to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [9] but
has the additional advantage of introducing exploration into the process.
The most common form of smooth best response of Player i, BR
i
(σ−i), is
the following [9]:
BR(σ−i)(si) =
exp(ui(si, σ−i)/ξ)∑
s˜i exp(u
i(s˜i, σ−i)/ξ)
(8)
where ξ is the randomisation parameter. When the value of ξ is close to zero, a
BR is close to BR and players exploit their action space, whereas large values
of ξ result in complete randomisation [9].
Stochastic fictitious play is a modification of fictitious play under which
Player i uses BR
i
(σ−it ) to randomly select an action instead of selecting a best
response action BRi(σ−it ). We reinforce the fact that the difference between clas-
sic fictitious play and stochastic fictitious play is in the decision rule the players
use to choose the actions. The updating rule (7) that is used to update the beliefs
of the opponents’ strategies are the same in both algorithms.
When Player i uses equation (7) to update the beliefs about opponents’
strategies he treats the environment of the game as stationary and implicitly
assumes that the actions of the players are sampled from a fixed probability
distribution [9]. Therefore recent observations have the same weight as initial
ones. This approach leads to poor adaptation when other players change their
strategies.
A variation of fictitious play that treats the opponents’ strategies as dynamic
and places greater weights on recent observations while we calculate each action’s
probability is geometric fictitious play, introduced in [9]. According to this vari-
ation of fictitious play the estimation of each opponent’s probability to play an
action sj is evaluated using the formula:
σjt (s
j) = (1− z)σjt−1(sj) + zIsjt=sj (9)
where z ∈ (0, 1) is a constant.
In Section 3 we introduce a new variant of fictitious play in which the constant
z is automatically adapted in response to the observations of opponent strategy.
3 Adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play
The objective of players when they maintain beliefs σ−it is to estimate the mixed
strategy of opponents. However consider streaming data where in each time step
a new observation arrives and it belongs to one of J available classes [19]. When
the objective is to estimate the probability of each class given the observed data,
this objective can be expressed as the fitting of a multinomial distribution to the
6observed data stream. If a fixed multinomial distribution over time is assumed,
then its parameters can be estimated using the empirical frequencies of the
previously observed data. This is exactly the strategy estimation described in
Section 2.2. But in real life applications it is rare to observe a data stream from a
constant distribution. Hence there is a need for the learning algorithm to adapt
to the distribution that the data currently follow. This is similar to iterative
games, where we expect that all players update their strategies simultaneously.
An approach that is widely used in the streaming data literature to handle
changes in data distributions is forgetting. This suggests that recent observations
have greater impact on the estimation of the algorithm’s parameters than the
older ones. Two methods of forgetting are commonly used: window based meth-
ods and resetting. Salgado et.al [20] showed that when abrupt changes (jumps)
are detected then the optimal policy is to reset the parameters of the algorithm.
In the case of smooth changes (drift) in the data stream’s distribution, a solution
is to use only a segment of the data (a window). The simplest form of window
based methods uses a specific segment size constantly; there are also approaches
that adaptively change the size of the window but they are more complicated.
Some examples of algorithms that use window based methods are [21–23].
Another method is to introduce forgetting, which is also used in geometric
fictitious play (9), to discount the old information by giving higher weights to
the recent observations. When the discount parameter is fixed it is necessary to
know a priori the distribution of data and the way that they evolve through time
due to the fact that we must choose the forgetting factor in advance. In addition
the performance of the approximation when there are changes that result from a
jump or non-constant drift is poor for a fixed forgetting factor. For those reasons
this methodology has serious limitations.
A more sophisticated solution is the use of a forgetting factor that takes
into account the recent data and the previously estimated parameters of the
model and adapts to observed changes in the data distribution. Such a forgetting
factor was proposed by Haykin [24] in the case of recursive least squares filtering
problems. In [24] the objective was the minimisation of the mean square error of a
cost function that depends on an exponential weighting factor λ. This forgetting
factor is then recursively updated using gradient descent of the forgetting factor,
λ, with respect to the residual errors of the algorithm. Anagnostopoulos [19]
proposed a generalisation of this method in the context of online streaming data
from a generalised linear model according to which the forgetting factors are
adaptively changed by using gradient ascent of the log-likelihood of the new
data point.
In the streaming data context, after t time intervals we observe a sequence of
data x1, . . . , xt and we fit a model f(θt|x1:t), where θt are the model’s parameters
at time t. Note that the parameters of the model, θt, depend on the observed data
stream x1:t and the forgetting factors λt. Since the estimated model parameters
depend on λt we will write θt(λt). The log-likelihood of the data that will arrive
at time t+1, xt+1, given the parameters of the model at time t will be denoted as
7L(xt+1; θt(λt)). Then the update of the forgetting factor λt+1 can be expressed
as:
λt+1 = λt + γ
∂L(xt+1; θt(λt))
∂λ
(10)
where γ is the learning rate parameter of the gradient ascent algorithm.
As in [19], we can apply the forgetting factor of equation (10) in the case
of fitting a multinomial distribution to streaming data. This will result a new
update rule that players can use, instead of the classic fictitious play update rule
(7), to maintain beliefs about opponents’ strategies.
In classic fictitious play the weight function (5) places the same weight on
every observed action. In particular κjt (s
j) denotes the number of times that
player j has played the action sj in the game. To introduce forgetting the impact
of the previously observed actions in the weight function will be discounted by
a factor λt−1. Such a weight function can be written as:
κjt (s
j) = λjt−1κ
j
t−1(s
j) + Isj
t−1=s
j (11)
where Isj
t−1=s
j is the same identity function as in (7). To normalise we set nt =∑
sj∈Sj κ
j
t (s
j). From the definition of κjt (s
j) we can use the following recursion
to evaluate njt
njt = λ
j
t−1n
j
t−1 + 1. (12)
Then player i’s beliefs about his opponent j’s probability of playing action sj
will be:
σjt (s
j) =
κjt (s
j)
njt
. (13)
Similarly to the case of geometric fictitious play 0 < λt ≤ 1. Moreover when
the value of λt is close to zero this results in very fast adaptation and when
λt = 0 the players are myopic, and thus they respond to the last action of their
opponents. On the other hand when λt = 1 this results in the classic fictitious
play update rule.
From this point on in we will only consider inference over a single opponent
mixed strategy in fictitious play. In the case of multiple opponents separate
estimates are formed identically and independently for each opponent. We will
therefore drop all dependence on player i, and write st, σt and κt(s) for the
opponent’s action, strategy and weight function respectively.
The value of λ should be updated in order to have adaptive forgetting factors.
Initially we have to evaluate the log-likelihood of the recently observed action st
given the beliefs of the opponents strategies. The log-likelihood is of the following
form:
L(st;σt−1) = lnσt−1(st) (14)
When we replace σt−1(st) with its equivalent from (13) the log-likelihood can
be written as:
L(st;σt−1) = ln
(κt−1(st)
nt−1
)
= lnκt−1(st)− lnnt−1 (15)
8In order to estimate the update of λ, equation (10), the evaluation of the
log-likelihood’s derivative with respect to λ is required. The terms κt and nt
both depend on λ. Hence the derivative of (15) is:
∂L(st;σt−1)
∂λ
=
1
κt−1(st)
∂
∂λ
κt−1(st)− 1
nt−1
∂
∂λ
nt−1 (16)
Note that κt(st) = λt−1κt−1(st) + Isj
t−1=s
j , so
∂
∂λ
κt(s)|λ=λt−1 = κt−1(s) + λt−1
∂
∂λ
κt−1(s)|λ=λt−1 (17)
and similarly
∂
∂λ
nt|λ=λt−1 = nt−1 + λt−1
∂
∂λ
nt−1|λ=λt−1 (18)
We can use equations (17) and (18) to recursively estimate ∂∂λκt−1(s) for each
s and ∂∂λnt−1 and hence calculate
∂
∂λL(st;σt−1). Summarising we can evaluate
the adaptive forgetting factor λt as follows:
λt = λt−1 + γ
( 1
κt−1(s)
∂
∂λ
κt−1(s)− 1
nt−1
∂
∂λ
nt−1
)
(19)
To ensure that λt remains in (0, 1) we truncate it to this interval whenever
it leaves.
After updating their beliefs players can choose their actions by choosing
either a best response to their beliefs of their opponents strategies or a smooth
best response. Table 1 summarises the algorithm of adaptive forgetting factor
fictitious play.
At time t, each player carries out the following
1. Updates the weights κjt(s
j) = λjt−1κ
j
t−1(s
j) + I
s
j
t−1=s
j
2. Update ∂
∂λ
κjt−1(s) and
∂
∂λ
njt−1 using equations (17) and (18)
3. Based on the weights of step 1 each player updates his beliefs about his opponents
strategies using σjt (s
j) =
κ
j
t
(sj)
n
j
t
, where njt = λ
j
t−1n
j
t−1 + 1.
4. Choose an action based on the beliefs of step 3 according either to best response,
BR, or to smooth best response BR
5. Observe opponent’s action sjt
6. Update the forgetting factor using: λjt = λ
j
t−1 + γ
(
1
κ
j
t−1(s)
∂
∂λ
κjt−1(s) −
1
n
j
t−1
∂
∂λ
njt−1
)
Table 1. Adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play algorithm
94 AFFFP parameters
The adaptive rule that we choose to update the forgetting factor λ is based on
the gradient ascent algorithm. It is well known that different initial values of
an algorithm’s parameter and learning rates γ can lead to poor results of the
gradient ascent algorithm [25]. This is because very small values of γ lead to poor
exploration of the space and thus the gradient ascent algorithm can be trapped
in an area where the solution is not optimal, whereas large values of γ can result
in big jumps that will lead the algorithm away from the area of the optimum
solution. Thus we should evaluate the performance of adaptive forgetting factor
fictitious play for different combinations of the step size parameter γ and initial
values λ0.
We employed a toy example, where a single opponent chooses his actions us-
ing a mixed strategy which has a sinusoidal form, a situation which corresponds
to smooth changes in the data distribution of online streaming data. The oppo-
nent uses a strategy of the following form over the t = 1, 2, . . . 1000 iterations
of the game: σt(1) =
cos 2pitβ +1
2 = 1 − σt(2), where β = 1000. We repeated this
example 100 times for each combination of γ and λ0. Each time we measured
the mean square error of the estimated strategy against the real one. The range
of γ and λ0 was 10
−6 ≤ γ ≤ 10−1 and 10−1 ≤ λ0 ≤ 1 respectively.
(a) Contour plot of mean square er-
ror when the range of γ and λ is
10−6 ≤ γ ≤ 10−1 and 10−1 ≤ λ ≤ 1
respectively.
(b) Contour plot of mean square
error when the range of γ and
λ is 10−6 ≤ γ ≤ 5× 10−3 and
0.6 ≤ λ ≤ 1 respectively
Fig. 1. Contour plot of mean square error
The average mean square error for all the combinations of γ and λ0 is depicted
on Figure 1. The mean square error is minimised in the dark area of the contour
plot. In Figure 1(a) we observe that when γ is less than 10−3 and λ0 is greater
than 0.6 the mean square error is minimised. In Figure 1(b) we reduce the range
of γ and λ0 to be 10
−6 ≤ γ ≤ 5× 10−3 and 0.6 ≤ λ0 ≤ 1, respectively. Values of
λ0 greater than 0.75 result in estimators with small mean square error, for certain
values of γ, and as the value of λ0 approaches 0.95 so it is minimised for a wider
range of learning rates. We also observe that when λ0 is greater than 0.98 and
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as we approach 1 then the mean square error increases. This suggests that for
values of λ0 greater than 0.98 the value of λ appoaches 1 very fast and thus the
algorithm behaves like the classic fictitious play update rule. In contrast when
λ0 is less than 0.75 then we introduce big discounts to the previously observed
actions from the beginning of the game and the players easily use strategies
that are reactions to their opponent’s randomisation. In addition, independently
from the initial value of λ0, when the learning rate γ, is greater than 0.001 the
algorithm results in poor estimations of the opponent’s strategy. This is because
for γ greater than 0.001 the step that a player moves towards the maximum of
the log-likelihood is very large and that results in values of λ which are close
either to zero or to one. So the player uses either the classic fictitious play update
rule or responds to his opponent’s last observed action.
We further examine the relationship between the performance of adaptive
forgetting factor fictitious play and the sequence of λ’s in the drift toy example
with respect to the initial values of the parameters λ0 and γ . We use two in-
stances of the drift toy example. In the first one we set a fixed value of parameter
γ = 10−4 and examine the performance of our algorithm and the evolution of
λ during the game for different values of λ0 = {0.55, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99}. In the
second one we fix λ0 and examined the results of the algorithm for different val-
ues of γ = {10−6, 10−5, 5 · 10−4, 10−4, 10−3}. Figures 2 and 3 depict the results
of the case of fixed γ and λ0, respectively. Each row of these figures consists
of two plots for the same set of parameters, γ and λ0. The left figure shows
the evolution of λ during the game and the right one depicts the pre-specified
strategy of the opponent and its corresponding prediction.
As we observe in Figure 2, when we set λ0 = 0.55 the tracking of the op-
ponent’s strategy was affected by his randomisation. The value of λ constantly
decreases which results in giving higher weights to the recently observed actions
even if they are a consequence of randomisation. When we increase the value
of λ0 to 0.8 the results are improving. When we increase λ0 to 0.90 or 0.95
the resulting sequence of λ’s does not affect the tracking of opponent’s strategy.
On the other hand when we increase the value of λ0 to 0.99 the value of λ is
very close to 1 for many iterations which result in poor approximation for the
same reasons that the classic fictitious play update rule fails to capture smooth
changes in opponent’s strategy. When λ0 is decreased to 0.9 the approximation
of opponent’s strategy improves significantly.
Figure 3 depicts the results when λ0 = 0.95 for different values of parameter
γ. We observe that high values of γ (γ = 10−3, 5 · 10−4) result in big changes in
the value of λ and that affects the quality of the approximation. On the other
hand when we use very small values of γ, γ = 10−5, or γ = 10−6, it leads to
very small deviations from λ0. The good approximation results of opponent’s
strategy that we observe for those two values of γ are because of the initial value
λ0. In this scenario if we fix the value of λ = 0.95 during the whole game we will
also have a good approximation. But in real life applications it is impossible to
choose so efficiently the value of λ0. When γ = 10
−4 we observe changes in the
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values of λ, which are not so sudden as the ones for γ = 10−3 or γ = 5 · 10−4,
that lead to good approximation of opponent’s strategy.
Fig. 2. Evolution of λ and tracking of σt(1) when the true strategies are mixed when
γ is fixed. The pre-specified strategy of the opponent and its prediction are depicted
as the red and blue line respectively.
We also performed simulations for a case where jumps occur. In this ex-
ample we used a game of 1000 iterations and two available actions, 1 and 2.
The opponent played action 1 with probability σ2t (1) = 1 during the first 250
and the last 250 iterations of the game and for the remaining iterations of the
game σ2t (1) = 0. The probability of the second action can be calculated by using
σ2t (2) = 1 − σ2t (1). The results for the case of fixed γ and λ0 are depicted in
Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
When abrupt changes occur the different values of γ do not affect the per-
formance of the algorithm as we observe in Figure 5. On the contrary the initial
value of λ affects the estimation of the jumps in the opponent’s strategies. As
we observe in Figure 4 the opponent’s strategy approximation and the evolution
of λ are similar when λ0 is equal to 0.55, 0.8 and 0.9 respectively. In those three
cases when a jump is observed, there is a drop in the value of λ, then λ slightly
increases and finally it remains constant until the next jump occurs.
The sequences of λ and the approximation results of the last two cases,
λ0 = 0.95 and λ0 = 0.99 are different from the 3 cases we described above. In
both of them the opponent’s strategy tracking is good at the first 250 iterations,
but afterwards these two examples have the opposite behaviour. In the example
where λ0 = 0.95 the opponent’s strategy is correctly approximated when σt(1) =
0. Because of the high weights of the previously observed actions, the likelihood
needs a large number of iterations to become constant and thus λ becomes equal
to 1. Then the adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play process becomes identical
12
Fig. 3. Evolution of λ and tracking of σt(1) when the true strategies are mixed when
λ0 is fixed. The pre-specified strategy of the opponent and its prediction are depicted
as the red and blue line respectively
Fig. 4. Evolution of λ and tracking of σt(1) when the true strategies are pure when γ
is fixed. The pre-specified strategy of the opponent and its prediction are depicted as
the red and blue line respectively.
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Fig. 5. Evolution of λ and tracking of σt(1) when the true strategies are pure when λ0
is fixed. The pre-specified strategy of the opponent and its prediction are depicted as
the red and blue line respectively.
to classic fictitious play and fails to adapt to the second jump. When λ0 is equal
to 0.99 adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play fails to adapt the estimation
of opponent’s strategy to the first jump. But when the second jump occurs,
the likelihood of action 1 is small since action 2 is played for 500 consecutive
iterations, and a drop in the value of λ is observed which resulted in adaptation
to the change of opponent’s strategy.
By taking into account the above results we observe that γ = 10−4 and
0.8 ≤ λ0 ≤ 0.9 leads to useful approximations when we consider cases where
both smooth and abrupt changes in opponent’s strategy are possible to happen.
In the remainder of the article we set γ = 10−4 and λ0 = 0.8.
5 Results
5.1 Climbing hill game
We initially compared the performance of the proposed algorithm with the re-
sults of geometric and classic stochastic fictitious play in a three player climbing
hill game. This game which is depicted in Table 2, generalises the climbing hill
game that was presented in [26] and exhibits a long best response path from the
risk-dominant joint mixed action (D,D,U) to the Nash equilibrium.
We present the results of 1000 replications of a learning episode of 1000
iterations for each game. For each replication of 1000 iterations we computed
the mean payoff. After the end of the 1000 replications the overall mean of the
1000 payoff means was computed.
The value of the learning parameter z of geometric fictitious play was set
to 0.1. We selected this value of z on the pemise that the algorithm has the
14
U
M
D
U M D
0 0 0
0 50 40
0 0 30
U
U M D
-300 70 80
-300 60 0
0 0 0
M
U M D
100 -300 90
0 0 0
0 0 0
D
Table 2. Climbing hill game with three players. Player 1 selects rows, Player 2 selects
columns, and Player 3 selects the matrix. The global reward depicted in the matrices,
is recived by all players. The unique Nash equilibrium is in bold.
best results in the tracking experiment with pre-specified opponents strategy
that we used in Section 4 to select the parameters of AFFFP. Thus we will
use this learning rate ia all the simulations that we present in the rest of this
article. For all algorithms we used smooth best responses (8) with randomisation
parameter ξ in the smooth best response function equal to 1, allowing the same
randomisation for all algorithms.
Adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play performed better than both geo-
metric and stochastic fictitious play. The overall mean global payoff was 95.26
for AFFFP whereas the respective payoffs for geometric and stochastic fictitious
play were 91.7 and 70.3. Stochastic fictitious play didn’t converge to the Nash
equilibrium after 1000 replications. Also when we are concerned about the speed
of convergence the proposed variations of fictitious play outperform geometric
fictitious play. This can be seen if we reduce the iterations of the game to 200.
Then the overall mean payoffs of AFFFP is 90.12 when for geometric fictitious
play it is 63.12. This is because adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play requires
approximately 100 iterations to reach the Nash equilibrium, when geometric
fictitious play needs at least 300. This difference is depicted in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Probability of playing the (U,U,D) equilibrium for one run of each of AFFFP
(blue dot line), geometric fictitious play (black solid line) and stochastic fictitious play
(green diamond line) for the three player climbing hill game.
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5.2 Vehicle target assignment game
We also compared the performance of the proposed variation of fictitious play
against the results of geometric fictitious play in the vehicle target assignment
game that is described in [7]. In this game agents should coordinate to achieve
a common goal which is to maximise the total value of the targets that are
destroyed. In particular in a specific area we place I vehicles and J targets. For
each vehicle i, its available actions are simply the targets that are available to
engage. Each vehicle can choose only one target to engage but a target can be
engaged by many vehicles. The probability that player i has to destroy a target j
is pij if it chooses to engage target j. We assume that the probability each agent
has to destroy a target is independent of the actions of the other agents, and the
target is destroyed if any one agent succesfully destroyes it, so the probability a
target j is destroyed by the vehicles that engage it is 1−∏i:si=j (1− pij). Each
of the targets has a different value Vj . The expected utility that is produced
from the target j is the product of its value Vj and the probability it has to
be destroyed by the vehicles that engage it. More formally we can express the
utility that is produced from target j as:
Uj(s) = Vj(1−
∏
i:si=j
(1− pij)) (20)
The global utility is then the sum of the utilities of each target:
ug(s) =
∑
j
Uj(s). (21)
Wonderfull life utility was used to to evaluate each vehicle’s payoff. Then the
utility that a vehicle i receives after engange a target j, si = j, is
ui(s
i, s−i) = Uj(si, s−i)− Uj(si0, s−i) = (22)
where si0 was set to be the greedy action of player i: s
i
0 = argmax
j
Vjpij .
In our simulations we used thirty vehicles and thirty targets that were placed
uniformly at random in a unit square. The probability of a vehicle i to destroy
a target j is proportional to the inverse of its distance from this target 1/dij .
The values of the targets are independently sampled from a uniform distribution
with range in [0 100].
The vehicles had to “negotiate” with the other vehicles (players) for a fixed
number of negotiation steps before they choose a target to engage. A negotiation
step begins with each player choosing a target to engage and it ends by the
agents exchanging this information with the others, and updating their beliefs
about their opponents’ strategies based on this information. The target that
each vehicle will choose in the game will be his action at the final negotiation
step.
Figure 7 depicts the average results for 100 instances of the game for the
two algorithms, AFFFP and geometric fictitious play. For each instance, both
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algorithms run for 100 negotiation steps. To be able to average across the 100
instances we normalise the scores of an instance by the highest observed score
for that instance (since some instances will have greater available score than
others). As in the strategic form game, we set the randomisation parameter ξ in
the smooth best response function equal to 1 for both algorithms.
In Figure 7 we observe that AFFFP result in a better solution on average
than geometric fictitious play. Furthermore geometric fictitious play needs more
iterations to reach the area where its reward is maximised than AFFFP.
Fig. 7. Utility of AFFFP (dotted line) and geometric fictitious play (dashed line) for
the vehicle target assignment game.
5.3 Disaster management scenario
Finally we test our algorithm in a disaster management scenario as described in
[27]. Consider the case where a natural disaster has happened (an earthquake
for example) and because of this NI simultaneous incidents occurred in different
areas of a town. In each incident j, a different number of peopleNp(j) are injured.
The town has a specific number of ambulances Namb available that are able to
collect the injured people. An ambulance i can be at the area of incident j in time
Tij and has capacity ci. We will assume that the total capacity of the ambulances
is larger than the number of injured people. Our aim is to allocate the ambulances
to the incidents in such a way that the average time 1Namb
∑
i:si=j Tij that the
ambulances need to reach the incidents is minimised while all the people that
are engaged in the incident will be saved. Then we can formulate this scenario
as follows. Each of the Namb players should choose one of the NI incidents as
actions. The utility to the system of an allocation is:
ug(s) = − 1
Namb
NI∑
j=1
∑
i:si=j
Tij −
NI∑
j=1
max
(
0, Np(j)−
∑
i:si=j
ci
)
(23)
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where i = 1, . . . , Namb and s
i is the action of player i. The emergency units
have to “negotiate” with each other and choose the incident which they will be
allocated to, using a variant of fictitious play.
The first component of the utility function expresses the first aim, to allocate
the ambulance to an incident as fast as possible. Thus the agents have to choose
an incident with small Tij . The second objective, which is to save all the injured
people that are engaged in an incident, is expressed as the second component
of the utility function. It is a penalty factor that adds to the average time the
number of the people that were not able to be saved. Like the vehicle target
assignment game each player can choose only one incident to help, but in each
incident more than one player can provide his help.
We follow [27] and consider simulations with 3 and 5 incidents, and 10, 15
and 20 available ambulances. We run 200 trials for each of the combinations of
ambulances and incidents, for each algorithm. Since this scenario is NP-complete
[27] our aim is not to find the optimal solution, but to reach a sufficient or a
near optimal solution. Furthermore the algorithm we present here is “any-time”,
since the system utility generally increases as the time goes on, and therefore
interruption before termination results in good, if not optimal actions. In each
of the 200 trials the time Tij that an ambulance needs to reach an incident is
a random number uniformly distributed between zero and one. The capacity
of each ambulance is an integer uniformly distributed between one and four.
Finally the total number of injured people that are involved in each incident
is a uniformly distributed integer between ct2∗NI and
ct
NI
, where ct is the total
capacity of the emergency units ct =
∑Namb
i=1 ci.
In each trial we allow 200 negotiation steps. In this scenario because of the
utility function structure, a big randomisation parameter ξ in the smooth best
response function can easily lead to unnecessary randomisation. For that reason
we set ξ to 0.01 for both algorithms which results in a decision rule which ap-
proximates best response. The learning rate and the initial value of λ in adaptive
forgetting factor is set to 10−4 and 0.8 respectively.
We use the same performance measures as [27] to test the performance of our
algorithms. We compared the solution of our algorithm against the centralised
solution which can be obtained using binary integer programming. In particular
we compared the solution of our algorithm against the one we obtain by using
Matlab’s bintprog algorithm,which uses a branch and bound algorithm that is
based on linear programming relaxation [28–30]. To compare the result of these
two algorithms we use the ratio
ffp
fopt
, where ffp is the utility that the agents
could gain if they used the variations of fictitious play we propose and fopt is the
utility that the agents should gain if they were using the solution of bintprog.
Thus values of the ratio smaller than one mean that the proposed variations of
fictitious play perform better than bintprog, and values of the ratio larger than
one mean that the proposed variations of fictitious play perform worst than
bintprog. Furthermore we measured the percentage of the instances in which all
the casualties are rescued, and the overall percentage of people that are rescued.
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%complete % saved ffp/fopt
10 ambulances 82.0 92.84 1.2702
3 incidents 15 ambulances 77.5 89.88 1.2624
20 ambulances 81.0 90.59 1.2058
10 ambulances 91.0 98.54 1.6631
5 incidents 15 ambulances 90.5 98.28 1.5088
20 ambulances 83.0 93.6 1.4251
Table 3. Results of adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play after 200 negotiation steps
for the three performance measures.
%complete % saved ffp/fopt
10 ambulances 95,5 99,74 1.2970
3 incidents 15 ambulances 74,5 88.24 1.2965
20 ambulances 60.55 87.9 1.2779
10 ambulances 94.5 99.68 1.8587
5 incidents 15 ambulances 79.0 88.28 1.7443
20 ambulances 48.50 86.54 1.8545
Table 4. Results of geometric fictitious play after 200 negotiation steps for the three
performance measures.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results we have obtained in the last step of ne-
gotiations between the ambulances for the disaster management scenario when
they use adaptive forgetting factor and geometric fictitious play respectively, to
coordinate.
The total percentage of the people that were saved and the ratio of ffp/fopt
were similar within the groups of 3 and 5 incidents when the adaptive forgetting
factor fictitious play algorithm were used. Regarding the percentage of the trials
in which all people were saved, we can observe that as we increase the complexity
of the scenario, hence the number of ambulances, the performance of adaptive
forgetting factor fictitious play is decreasing.
When we compare the results of the two algorithms we can observe that in
both cases of 3 and 5 incidents respectively adaptive forgetting factor fictitious
play perform better than geometric fictitious play when the scenarios included
more ambulances, and therefore were more complicated. Especially in the case
of the 20 ambulances the difference when we consider the number of the cases
where all the casualties were collected from the incidents, was greater than 20%.
The differences we can observe from bintprog ’s centralised solution, for both
algorithms, can be explained from the structure of the utility function (23). The
first component of the utility is a number between zero and one since it is the
average of the times, Tij , that the ambulances need to reach the incidents. On
the other hand the penalty factor, even in the cases where only one person is not
collected from the incidents, is greater than the first component of the utility.
Thus a local search algorithm like the variations of fictitious play we propose
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initially searches for an allocation that collects all the injured people, so the
penalty component of the utility will be zero, and afterwards for the allocation
that minimises also the average time that the ambulances needed to reach the
incidents. It is therefore easy to become stuck in local optima.
We have also examined how the results are influenced by the number of
iterations we use in each of the 200 trials of the game. For that reason we have
compared the results that we would have obtained if in each instance of the
simulations we had stopped the negotiations between the emergency units after
50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations for both algorithms. Tables 5-7 and 8-10 depict
the results for adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play and geometric fictitious
play respectively.
Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 74.5 81.0 82.0 82.0
3 incidents 15 ambulances 73.0 75.5 77.5 77.5
20 ambulances 73.5 78.0 80.0 81.0
10 ambulances 80.0 87.5 90.0 91.0
5 incidents 15 ambulances 76.5 84.5 89.5 90.5
20 ambulances 62.0 77.0 80.0 83.0
Table 5. Percentage of solutions in which the capacity of the ambulance in every
incident was enough to cover all injured people for different stopping times of the
negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the adaptive forgetting factor fictitious
play algorithm.
Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 91.44 92.35 92.95 92.84
3 incidents 15 ambulances 88.65 90.28 89.97 89.88
20 ambulances 89.09 89.33 90.44 90.59
10 ambulances 96.39 97.80 98.51 98.54
5 incidents 15 ambulances 94.84 97.22 98.03 98.29
20 ambulances 87.61 91.90 92.81 93.61
Table 6. Average percentage of injured people collected for different stopping times
of the negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the adaptive forgetting factor
fictitious play algorithm.
We can see from tables 5-7 that the performance of adaptive forgetting factor
fictitious play, in all the measures that we used, is similar for 100, 150 and 200
negotiation steps. In particular when we consider the percentage of the instances
20
Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 1.2791 1.2603 1.2669 1.2702
3 incidents 15 ambulances 1.2701 1.2452 1.2319 1.2624
20 ambulances 1.2142 1.1971 1.1943 1.2058
10 ambulances 1.6989 1.6827 1.6772 1.6631
5 incidents 15 ambulances 1.5569 1.5352 1.5304 1.5088
20 ambulances 1.5298 1.4413 1.4306 1.4251
Table 7. Average percentage of the ratio ffp/fopt for different stopping times of the
negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the adaptive forgetting factor fictitious
play algorithm.
Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 94.0 94.0 94.7 95.5
3 incidents 15 ambulances 71.0 73.0 73.3 74.5
20 ambulances 60.5 61.3 62.0 63.0
10 ambulances 86.0 92.0 93.3 94.5
5 incidents 15 ambulances 79.0 78.0 79.0 82.0
20 ambulances 42.0 49.0 47.3 48.5
Table 8. Percentage of solutions in which the capacity of the ambulance in every
incident was enough to cover all injured people for different stopping times of the
negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the geometric fictitious play algorithm.
Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 99.62 99.65 99.69 99.74
3 incidents 15 ambulances 88.20 88.21 88.21 88.24
20 ambulances 86.65 87.41 88.23 89.90
10 ambulances 97.20 99.54 99.61 99.68
5 incidents 15 ambulances 94.84 97.22 98.03 98.29
20 ambulances 85.33 86.38 86.391 86.54
Table 9. Average percentage of injured people collected for different stopping times
of the negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the geometric fictitious play
algorithm.
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Iterations
50 100 150 200
10 ambulances 1.2957 1.2928 1.3039 1.2970
3 incidents 15 ambulances 1.2965 1.3039 1.2801 1.2740
20 ambulances 1.2779 1.2744 1.2723 1.2722
10 ambulances 1.8587 1.8540 1.8550 1.8519
5 incidents 15 ambulances 1.7443 1.7205 1.7085 1.7074
20 ambulances 1.8545 1.7845 1.7744 1.7727
Table 10. Average percentage of the ratio ffp/fopt for different stopping times of the
negotiations, 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations of the geometric fictitious play algorithm.
that the ambulances collected all the injured people and the ratio ffp/fopt the
difference in the results after 100 and 200 negotiation steps is between 1% and
4.5%. The differences become even smaller for the percentage of the people that
were saved which was less than 2%.
Geometric fictitious play was trapped in an area of a local minimum after
few iterations since the results are similar after 50, 100, 150 and 200 iterations.
This is reflected in the results where geometric fictitious play performed worse
than adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play especially in the complicated cases
where the negotiations where between 20 ambulances.
Adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play performed also better than the Ran-
dom Neural Network (RNN) presented in [27], when we consider the percentage
of the cases in which all the injured people are collected and the overall percent-
age of people that are rescued. The percentage of instances where the proposed
allocations by the RNN could collect all the casualties were from 25 to 69 per-
cent. The corresponding results of adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play are
from 77.5 to 94.5. The overall percentage of people that are rescued by the RNN
algorithm are similar to the ones of adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play,
between 85 and 98.5 percent. The ratio
ffp
fopt
reported by [27] is better than that
shown here. However in [27] only the examples in which all the casualties were
collected were included to evaluate the ratio. Cases with high penalties, since the
uncollected casualties introduce higher penalties than the inefficient allocation,
were excluded from the ratio evaluation. Thus artificially improve their metric,
especially when one considers that in many instances less than 40% of their
solutions were included.
6 Conclusions
Fictitious play is a classic learning algorithm in games, but it is formed on an
(incorrect) stationarity assumption. Therefore we have introduced a variation of
fictitious play, adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play, which address this prob-
lem by giving higher weights to the recently observed actions using a heuristic
rule from the streaming data literature.
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We examined the impact of adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play parame-
ters λ0 and γ on the results of the algorithm. We showed that these two param-
eter should be chosen carefully since there are combinations of λ0 and γ that
induce very poor results. An example of such combination is when high values of
the learning rate γ are combined with low values of λ0. This is because values of
λ0 < 0.6 assign small weights to the previously observed actions and this results
in volatile estimations that are influenced by opponents’ randomisation. High
values of the learning rate γ, mean that λ0 is driven still lower, exacerbating the
problem further. From the simulation results we have seen that a satisfactory
combination of parameters λ0 and γ is 0.8 ≤ λ0 ≥ 0.9 and γ = 10−4.
Adaptive forgetting factor performed better than the competitor algorithms
in the climbing hill game. Moreover it converged to the a better solution than
geometric fictitious play in the vehicle target assignment game. In the disaster
management scenario the performance of the proposed variation of fictitious play
compared favorably with that of geometric fictitious play and a pre-planning
algorithm that uses neural networks [27].
Our empirical observations indicate that adaptive forgetting factor fictitious
play converges to a solution that is at least as good as that given by the com-
petitor algorithms. Hence by slightly increasing the computational intensity of
fictitious play less communication is required between agents to quickly coordi-
nate on a desirable solution.
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